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Abstract
We investigate the role of large creditors such as Japanese main banks in determining the
prices of corporate bonds when creditors face coordination problems. We present a model in
which a single large creditor and a group of small creditors independently decide whether to
continue lending to a borrowing company without common knowledge of the company’s fun-
damentals. Our numerical calculations in the model show that when these fundamentals are
good enough, corporate bond values fall as the information available to the large creditor dete-
riorates. However, when the fundamentals are bad enough, corporate bond values rise as the
information available to the large creditor deteriorates. These results suggest that, for both the
borrowing company and its bond holders, whether a better informed large creditor is benefi-
cial or detrimental crucially depends on the strength of the company’s fundamentals.
1. Introduction
1) Transitions in Bank-Firm Relationships in Japan
Since the end of World War II, banks have become a key component of the Japanese
financial system called the “main-bank system,” where bank-firm relationships are long-term
and multi-dimensional.1 Japanese listed companies usually hold business relationships with
multiple banks. Among them, those known as the “main banks” are generally the largest credi-
tors as well as the largest shareholders. The main banks even occupy a special place, which
often allows them to dispatch executives to companies and generally gain more information
than other creditors regarding a company’s financial situation. Moreover, the main banks
occasionally offer relief for financially distressed borrowers. Many listed companies in finan-
cial trouble have supported, have solved their problems, and have recovered because of the
relief efforts of the main banks, which backed them up financially and arbitrated conflicts
arising among interested parties.
In general, if a company suffers from a temporary funding problem but is expected to
recover from the crisis and realize high profits in the future, creditors can gain profits in the
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1 There is enormous discussion on the functions of the main-bank system in Japan. A summary on this issue is provid-
ed in Aoki and Patrick (1995).
future by offering relief to the company. However, if creditors take preventive action to recover
debts owing to them ahead of time for fear of the company going bankrupt, even though it is
fair to expect that the company will recover, this will result in a dead end for funding and
could result in bankruptcy. To avoid such a situation and to offer relief to a company, it is criti-
cal for creditors to take action in coordination with each other and to be prudent about the pre-
ventive recovery of their credits. The relief efforts of the main banks, by providing financial
support and by arbitrating the interests of involved parties, are effective in helping other credi-
tors to act in coordination and to prevent financially distressed companies from being pushed
into further difficulties due to a withdrawal of funding. In other words, relationships with the
main banks play an important role both in easing the financial constraints on companies that
have temporarily suffered a deterioration in their funding situation and in avoiding inefficient
company liquidation.2
However, after Japan’s economic bubble burst, banks ended up with massive bad loans,
which seriously undermined the banks’ financial standing. Subsequently, from 1997 to 1998,
when anxiety about the banks’ bad loan problems reached its peak, a financial crisis occurred
in Japan, in which large banks collapsed one after another. This crisis made the Japanese gov-
ernment recognize the need to settle the bad loans problem quickly in order to help Japan’s
economy recover. In a change from dealing with bad loan problems in an ad hoc manner, the
government proceeded with a systematic framework for a full-scale settlement of bad bank
loans through an injection of public funds. During this period, the main banks, on the alert for
any sign of more bad loans, began increasingly to hold off relief efforts for any troubled com-
panies that did not have clear prospects for a recovery. As a result, troubled companies for
which the main banks discontinued support went bankrupt.
2) Development of the Corporate Bond Market in Japan
For a long time after the end of World War II, companies depended on bank loans for
most of their funding. Raising money through bonds was a method of funding that was limited
to certain large reputable companies, since the amount and conditions of issuance of domestic
straight corporate bonds were severely regulated until 1996, when the qualification standard
for bond issuance was eliminated and restrictive financial covenants became liberalized. Also,
until the regulations on trustee banks were eliminated and the installation of commission
banks generally became obligatory, trustee banks conventionally re-purchased defaulted cor-
porate bonds at par value. In this way, corporate bond holders could impose the credit risks of
corporate bonds onto the trustee banks, so that investors did not understand that the credit risk
premiums of the issuing companies were an important factor that could affect corporate bond
prices.
As a result of the early 1990’s deregulation, which included the elimination of the qualifi-
cation standard for bond issuance, large companies improved their funding situation with
unsecured straight corporate bonds in the domestic corporate bond market. Consequently, for
an increasing number of companies, which had been depending on bank loans for most of
their external funding, corporate bonds became an important funding instrument. However,
some of the large companies went bankrupt due to financial problems after they had issued
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2 Please refer to Hoshi et al. (1990, 1991), Rajan (1992), and Detragiache (1994) regarding relief efforts by the main
banks for financially distressed companies.
corporate bonds, having been affected by the decline in asset prices and by economic stagna-
tion in the economy. For the first time in Japan’s post-war history, Yaohan Japan defaulted on
domestic convertible bonds after a public offering in 1997, and JDC Corporation defaulted on
domestic straight bonds after a public offering in 1998. These events made bond holders who
had purchased domestic corporate bonds in a public offering realize that they might suffer real
losses from a default. After this, institutional investors began to recognize that the credit risk
premiums of the issuing companies are an important factor that affects corporate bond prices
in the domestic corporate bond market. In addition, Mycal Corporation, which had obtained
an investment-grade rating from a Japanese rating institute at the time of issuance, defaulted
on straight corporate bonds for individual investors. Many individual investors suffered losses
because of this, and this resulted in considerable public concern. Based on these experiences,
in order to develop the Japanese corporate bond market in the future, it is necessary to
improve the framework for making an appropriate assessment of the credit risk premiums of
corporate bonds with regard to the unique situation of the Japanese credit market character-
ized by the dominant main banks.
3) Problems in Creditor Coordination and the Role of Large Creditors 
Many recent theoretical studies on debt contracts have focused on problems in negotia-
tion or coordination between financially distressed companies and their creditors. Most of
them assume the creditor is a single economic agent, so they neglect the problems of conflicts
of interest among multiple creditors. Corporate funding problems from multiple creditors have
been actively studied in recent years in terms of the moral hazard problems of borrowing com-
panies, which include the problems of strategic defaults and hold-ups.
First, with regard to strategic defaults, Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) indicated that if a
company raises funds from multiple creditors, re-negotiation between the company and its
creditors may become more difficult, which might reduce the risk of a strategic default by the
company. On the other hand, they also indicated that multiple creditors could increase the risk
of a default due to insufficient liquidity by making re-negotiation difficult. Berglöf et al.
(2000), using the incomplete contract theory, also pointed out that multiple creditors reduce
the risks of strategic defaults.
Regarding hold-up problems, Rajan (1992) explained that borrowings from multiple
creditors can limit the monopoly power that arises from borrowing from a single creditor, and
can ease hold-up problems. However, these studies on the moral hazard of borrowing compa-
nies mainly focused on the effects of multiple creditors on negotiation problems between bor-
rowers and creditors. There has been no explicit discussion about creditor coordination prob-
lems.
It is only recently that theoretical research has actively focused on the creditor coordina-
tion problems discussed in this article. There are two pioneering pieces of research. Hubert
and Schäfer (2002) indicated that if advantages in eliminating the monopoly power of a single
creditor exceed the disadvantages in increasing the risks of failure of creditor coordination, it
is desirable for borrowing companies to borrow from multiple creditors. Morris and Shin
(2004) discussed how a company’s risk of bankruptcy due to failure in creditor coordination
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affects debt prices.3
If the main banks do not play an active and leading role in offering relief to companies in
financial crisis, each creditor can attempt to recover their credits early in order to maintain
their value. This individually rational action could cause bankruptcy due to a rapid deteriora-
tion in the company’s funding situation, even if the company is fundamentally sound. Such a
bankruptcy is the result of a failure in creditor coordination. Morris and Shin (2004) call these
risks “coordination risks,” which are to be distinguished from the usual credit risks. 
If a coordination system cannot be established for a group of creditors through the leader-
ship of the main banks, how can creditor coordination problems affect both the risks of a com-
pany going bankrupt and the corporate bond prices? Could the main bank play a regulatory
role against creditor coordination failures, even if they do not take action to cooperate with the
other creditors? These important issues emerged in Japan for the first time after the financial
crisis in which the main banks displayed negative behavior in offering relief for troubled com-
panies. Therefore, in this article, we would like to develop a theoretical model to analyze cred-
itors’ actions in a situation that could cause coordination failure among the creditors of a com-
pany in danger of bankruptcy. By doing so, we will attempt to provide some clues to the solu-
tion for these problems. 
4) Analytical Framework
In this article, we develop a theoretical model that focuses on creditor coordination prob-
lems based on the method of global games to analyze how the proportion of credits held by
the large creditor and informational accuracy affect corporate bond prices. Global games, pio-
neered by Carlsson and van Damme (1993), are games with incomplete information, whose
type space is determined by the players each observing a private noisy signal of the underlying
state.4 Global games method shows how a slight departure from the common knowledge of the
state can generate a unique equilibrium even in those games that typically have multiple equi-
libria under common knowledge. Morris and Shin (2004) proposed a theoretical framework
for debt pricing considering the coordination risks by applying global games methodology to
coordination problems among creditors. Their model indicated that debt prices could be
uniquely determined in an equilibrium that was derived from interaction between a debtor’s
fundamentals and self-fulfilling beliefs. 
Takeda (2003) introduced a model for analyzing the role of large creditors in the coordi-
nation of creditors by extending the model of Morris and Shin (2004). He examined the role
of large creditors in coordination games that were played by a single large creditor and many
small creditors based on the premise of the uniform prior distribution of the fundamentals.
Furthermore, Takeda and Takeda (2005a) assumed normal distribution for the prior distribu-
tion of the fundamentals, extending a model of Takeda (2003), and proposed a model for ana-
lyzing the influence of the large creditor on debt prices. In this article, we analyzed how pri-
vate and public information that is related to the fundamentals affects debt prices. On the basis
of the model presented in Takeda and Takeda (2005a), we propose a framework to analyze the
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3 Please refer to Detragiache et al. (2000), Ongena and Smith (2000), and Elsas (2005) for empirical studies on credi-
tor coordination.
4 Please refer to Morris and Shin (2002a) for details on global games.
influence of creditor coordination problems on corporate bond prices, and discuss the role of
large creditors and the influence of private and public information. 
This article proposes a theoretical model that employs players of multiple sizes, following
a strand of recent studies related to global games.5 Corsetti et al. (2002, 2004), Takeda (2004),
Taketa (2004), and Bannier (2005a) studied asymmetric global games assuming the existence
of both large and small players as a method to analyze the influence of large speculators on a
currency crisis. Only recently have creditor coordination problems been investigated using a
method of asymmetric global games by Takeda (2003), Elsas et al. (2004), Bannier (2005b),
Takeda and Takeda (2005a, b), Schüle and Stadler (2005), and Schüle (2007). In this article, a
framework of asymmetrical global games is applied to the valuation of corporate bonds, and
we introduce a model to analyze the influence of large creditors on corporate bond prices.6
This article presents a model in which corporate bond prices are uniquely determined
under a circumstance in which creditors are only able to obtain noisy information related to a
company’s fundamentals. Numerical calculations proved that improvements in the accuracy of
the information available to large creditors raise corporate bond prices if the fundamentals are
good. However, if the fundamentals are bad, such improvements in the accuracy of the infor-
mation available to large creditors lower corporate bond prices.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes creditor coordination games,
Section 3 derives a unique equilibrium, Section 4 presents a numerical simulation of corporate
bond prices based on the model, and Section 5 concludes the discussion.
2. Creditor Coordination Games – A Basic Model
This model assumes an economy composed of three periods, such as t = 0, 1, and 2, in
which a single large creditor and multiple small creditors lend for a company’s investment
project. Let us assume that this company owns no capital, therefore the project will only be
financed by debts. On this assumption, the company raises investment funds from creditors in
the following ratio: ,0 1!m _ i from the large creditor and 1 - m from the small creditors. It is
also assumed that all creditors are rational and their rationality is common knowledge.
This investment project is assumed to be completed in Period 2 and yields a return. The
return in Period 2 is denoted by o, whose value is uncertain in Period 0 since it depends on
creditors’ actions in Period 1. The company promises the repayment of its debts at the end of
Period 2 to the amount of >L 0 to its creditors. If Project 2 yields a return o exceeding the
fixed amount of the repayment L, the creditors can receive the repayment as promised.
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5 Frankel et al. (2003) present detailed discussion on the determination of equilibrium in global games that contain
players of multiple sizes. 
6 Besides Morris and Shin (2004), Bruche (2003) has applied the method of global games to the valuation of corporate
bonds. Bruche (2003) extended the work of Morris and Shin (2004) and related it to the continuous-time structural model
for pricing corporate bonds à la Merton (1974). However, the model by Bruche (2003) only deals with small creditors of a
homogeneous size in the same way as Morris and Shin (2004). This article presents a model that is different from Bruche’s
model and it enables us to consider the role of large creditors. In addition, public debts including government bonds, were
analyzed using global games methods in research by Chui et al. (2002), Haldane et al. (2004), Hattori (2004), and Tanaka
(2005).
It is assumed that at Period 1 each creditor simultaneously decides whether he/she should
continue or discontinue lending until the completion of the project. The basic model in this
section assumes that the debts are collateralized. A case in which the debts include non-collat-
eralized corporate bonds will be explained in Section 4. The liquidation values of the collater-
als are ( , )K L0*! if the creditors collect and liquidate the collaterals after they discontinue
lending in Period 1. If the creditors collect and liquidate the collaterals because they cannot
receive the amount promised as repayment, the liquidation values of the collaterals fall to
,K K0
*
*! i7 .
If the creditors decide to continue lending in Period 1, they receive a pay-off depending
on the realized return o from the project. The value of o depends on two factors: fundamen-
tals i, which are randomly determined, and the severity of the disruption >z 0 to the project in
the case of liquidation before the completion of the project due to a discontinuation in the pro-
vision of funds by creditors in Period 1. Using to denote the proportion of creditors who
stop lending at Period 1, if i is larger than z , the project succeeds; while, if i is smaller
than, the project fails. Under this assumption, the realized return o from this project is 
where >V L represents the realized return if the project succeeds. To simplify this discussion,
let us normalize the pay-off so that L=1 and K 0
*
= . In this case, the amount collected from the
liquidated collaterals, if the creditors decide to discontinue lending in Period 1, is represented
as /K K KL* *
*
/ - -l _ _i i ; here < <K K L* * , thereby < <0 1l . Under this condition, the
pay-offs to the creditors are given in Table 1. To simplify the discussion, we assume that if
continuing the lending yields the same expected pay-off as discontinuing the lending, the
creditors will discontinue their lending. 
Although the creditors do not know the realized value of the fundamentals i until Period
2, they do receive private information about i. The large creditor receives a signal x
L
= i+h
with noise h, in accordance with a normal distribution in which the average is 0 and the vari-
ance is 1/c (c > 0 represents a constant for the precision of the signal received by the large
creditor); while a small creditor i receives a signal x
i
= i+f
i
with noise f
i
in accordance with a
normal distribution of which the average is 0 and the variance is 1/b (b > 0 represents a con-
stant for the precision of the signal received by the small creditor). f
i
is independent and iden-
tically distributed across the creditors and each one is independent of h and i. Distributions of
h and f
i
are assumed to be common knowledge among the creditors. 
The realized value of i is drawn from a normal distribution whose average is y and vari-
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7 This specification follows Morris and Shin (2004) and Bannier (2005a). On the other hand, Corsetti et al. (2002,
2004), Takeda (2003), and Takeda (2004), for simplification purposes, assume a uniform distribution.
o (i, ) = 
V if
K if
*
* z < i,
z $ i,
Table 1. The Pay-offs to Creditors
Project succeeds Project fails
(z < i) (z $ i)
Continue lending 1 0
Discontinue lending l l
ance is 1/a (a> 0 represents a constant for the precision of public information.7 Both y and a
are common knowledge and are exogenously given. In other words, y can be considered as the
creditors’ prior expected value of the fundamentals based only on public information. Each
creditor receives a signal and develops beliefs concerning the value of i based on public
information and the private signal. In addition, he/she also develops beliefs concerning the
distribution of signals received by the other creditors, as well as their estimates of i.8 The
other creditors also develop individual beliefs based on public information and the signals
they receive. 
The following is a summary of this model in accordance with time progression: 
- Period 0
・The company raises funds from the large creditor and small creditors in a ratio of
m:1-m.
・The company invests the funds in a project.
・The fundamentals i are determined. 
- Period 1
・Creditors receive private signals about i.
・Creditors decide whether to continue or discontinue lending.
・Creditors who decide to discontinue lending liquidate collaterals and receive a payoff
l.
- Period 2
・i becomes common knowledge and a return o on the company’s project is realized. 
・The creditors who continued lending receive a pay-off of “1” if the project succeeds;
they receive a pay-off of “0” if the project fails.
3. Equilibrium Analysis of the Creditor Coordination Game
1) Case of Complete Information
Before investigating the equilibrium of the basic model, let us consider what kinds of
choices would be optimal for the creditors if all of them know the precise value of i at the
time of decision-making, and discuss whether they should continue or discontinue lending.
If i > z, regardless of the other creditors’ choices, each creditor’s optimal choice is to
continue lending because the project will succeed, even if all the other creditors discontinue
lending. Conversely, if 0#i , regardless of the other creditors’ choices, each creditor’s optimal
choice is to discontinue lending because the project will fail, even if all the other creditors
continue lending.
What is interesting is the condition of , z0!i _ A, in which creditor coordination problems
occur. In this situation, if the proportion of creditors who continue lending is high enough to
forecast success for the project, continuation of the lending is the best choice for the creditors.
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8 Beliefs about other players’ beliefs are generally called “higher order beliefs.” Recent studies on this issue explain
that in various cases these beliefs play an important role in determining equilibria in incomplete information games. Please
refer to the survey by Kaiji and Morris (1997) regarding higher order beliefs.  
Conversely, if the proportion of creditors who discontinue lending is high enough to predict
failure for the project, discontinuation of the lending is the best choice for the creditors. Such
problems of creditor coordination are similar to those that can occur among creditors in a
model of bank runs proposed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In this situation, in the case of
a complete information game in which the fundamentals are common knowledge, as Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) articulated, multiple equilibria exist and they cannot be uniquely deter-
mined. In our case, continuing lending and discontinuing lending are both pure strategy Nash
equilibria. The creditors face uncertainty of beliefs, as expected pay-offs calculated by subjec-
tive probability, based on Bayes’ theorem, cannot be allocated to each strategy. Therefore they
cannot narrow down the number of strategies to a single optimal strategy. 
2) Case of Incomplete Information
Let us derive a Bayesian equilibrium for the situation in which each creditor considers the
following simple switching strategy. If the creditors receive signals that are less than a certain
critical value, they will discontinue lending; and if the creditors receive signals that are more
than a certain critical value, they will continue lending.9 Hereafter, the critical values of sig-
nals are called “critical signals.”
There are four critical values that characterize the unique equilibrium of this article’s
model. Two out of the four values are critical signals for small creditors x* and large creditors
x*
L
. The other two are the following two critical values for the fundamentals i, which exceed
the critical value, allowing the project to always succeed (hereafter, this critical value of fun-
damentals is called “critical fundamentals”). One value is denoted as i under a condition in
which the large creditor discontinues lending, and the other value is denoted as i under a con-
dition in which the large creditor continues lending. We derive four equilibrium conditions
that determine the above-mentioned critical values. 
When a small creditor i receives a signal x
i
, a posterior distribution of i is normally dis-
tributed with mean ( )/( )y x
i i
/ + +p a b a b and variance 1/(a + b). When a small creditor i
follows a switching strategy, he/she has a critical value p* for his/her switching strategy, and
continues lending if and only if the private signal x
i
exceeds x*(p*, y). Likewise, when the large
creditor receives a signal x
L
, a posterior distribution of i is normally distributed with mean
( )/( )y x
L L
/ + +p a c a c and variance 1/(a + c). When the large creditor follows a switching
strategy, he/she has a critical value p*
L
for their switching strategy, and continues lending if
and only if the private signal x
L
exceeds x*
L
(p*
L
, y).
Now, let us consider a certain value of critical fundamentals i under a condition in which
the large creditor discontinues lending. When fundamentals exceed the value i, even if only
small creditors continue lending, the project succeeds. i can be calculated with the following
equation: 
(( ( ) ( )))z x1 1 *= - - -i m b iU , (1)
where U expresses a cumulative standard normal distribution. If i exceeds i, regardless of any
actions by the large creditor, the project always succeeds. Note that i lies between zm and z.
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9 We can prove that the switching strategy is the only equilibrium, and generality will not be lost, even though we nar-
row our discussions down to the switching strategy alone. 
Next, we consider another value for the critical fundamentals i under a condition in
which the large creditor continues lending. When the fundamentals exceed i, the project suc-
ceeds if and only if the small creditors and the large creditor jointly continue lending. i can be
calculated with the following equation: 
(( ( ) ( )))z x1 1 *= - - - -i m m b iU . (2)
Note that i lies between q and z (1-m).
These values of i and i are functions of a critical signal x* for small creditors. However,
x* depends on the large creditor’s critical signal x*
L
. Therefore, to calculate the equilibrium, the
creditors’ optimization problems regarding the two critical fundamentals i and i should be
solved simultaneously.
First, let us consider the large creditor’s problems. The probability that fundamentals i
exceed the critical fundamentals i conditional on x
L
is ) ( ( ))( >Pr x
L L
= + -i a c p ii U .
Therefore, the expected pay-off when lending is continued by the large creditor who observed
the signal x
L
is ( ( ))
L
+ -a c p iU . Unless an expected pay-off for continued lending exceeds
a pay-off for discontinued lending l, the large creditor will discontinue lending. When lending
is continued by the large creditor who receives a critical value for signals x*
L
, the expected
pay-off should be the same value as the pay-off from an early redemption l. Therefore, the
large creditor’s critical signal x*
L
(p*
L
, y) should meet the following condition: 
( ( ))*
L
+ - =a c p i lU . (3)
Next, let us consider the problems of the small creditors. If i > i, the project succeeds
regardless of any actions taken by the large creditor. If < #i i i, then if and only if the large
creditor also continues lending and if the small creditors continue lending, the project suc-
ceeds. If #i i, even though the small creditors continue lending, the project always fails.
Since the optimal strategy for the small creditors is to continue lending if and only if the
expected pay-offs from continued lending exceed the pay-offs l from discontinuing the lend-
ing, a small creditors’ critical signal x*(p*, y) should fulfill the following condition:
( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))x d d* * *
L
+ - - + + - =a b i p c i i z a b i p i lU U
3
i
i
i
# #` j , (4)
where z expresses a standard normal distribution. To simplify equation (4), variables are con-
verted as follows: 
( ),
( ),
( ),
s *
*
*
/
/
/
+ -
+ -
+ -
a b i p
d a b i p
d a b i p
Z
[
\
]]
]]
Employing these variables, equation (4) can be rewritten as 
( ) ( )s ds s ds+ - =z z lU A O
3
d
d
d
# #_ i , (5)
where
( )s y* 1=
+
-
+
- -
+
+
a b
c
c
a c
d
c
a p c
a c
l
c
aA U-e o , (6)
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As Takeda and Takeda (2005a) have shown, by the iterative elimination of strictly domi-
nated strategies, the switching strategy can be shown to be the only equilibrium strategy. Our
results on the uniqueness of the equilibrium are summarized as follows: 
Proposition (Takeda and Takeda (2005a)): If ( )/ ( )/( ) /z 1 2 1#- + + -m r a b a a b b,
then there is a unique equilibrium in which the large creditor employs its switching strategy
with a critical signal x*
L
and the small creditors employ their switching strategy with a critical
signal x*.
The proposition above indicates that if the accuracy of the private signals is sufficiently
high for a given degree of accuracy in public information, the equilibrium is uniquely deter-
mined. The unique equilibrium is determined by equations (1), (2), (3), and (5), which jointly
determine the critical fundamentals i and i, and the critical signals x* and x*
L
.
4) Simulation of Coordination Risk Assessment for Corporate Bonds 
In this section, the basic model explained in the preceding section is modified to examine
a case in which debts are partially composed of corporate bonds, and we consider the prices of
corporate bonds with coordination risk premiums. The following variables’ influences on cor-
porate bonds are analyzed in detail: (i) the prior expected value of the fundamentals y, (ii) the
accuracy of the private information available to the large creditor c, and (iii) the accuracy of
the public information a.
Let us begin with a modification of the assumptions in the basic model and the introduc-
tion of the unsecured corporate bonds.10 Corporate bonds usually constitute a small portion of
the total debts of the companies that actually issue corporate bonds and usually the larger por-
tion is made up of secured bank loans with collaterals. For this reason, corporate bonds are
assumed in this section to be a small portion of the total debts that are mostly secured debts as
in the basic case. To simplify the discussion, the portion of corporate bonds is assumed to be
negligible. The creditors for the corporate bonds are considered to own unsecured corporate
bonds of face value 1, which is due in Period 2. They receive face value 1 as pay-offs if the
project succeeds when due in Period 2, and they receive 0 pay-off if the project fails and are
not able to gain a pay-off l as creditors of secured debts by discontinuing lending in Period 1,
because the corporate bonds are not secured with collaterals. If prior expected fundamentals y
are given, a prior value for unsecured corporate bonds W, as explained above, is calculated by
the following equation: 
( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))W y y x d y d*
L
= - - + -z a i c i i z a i iU
3
i
i
i
# # . (7)
It should be noted that a liquidation value l for the collaterals that the creditors obtain by
discontinuing lending is included in equation (7), which expresses the prices of unsecured cor-
porate bonds, not because unsecured corporate bond creditors can gain a pay-off l by discon-
tinuing lending, but because the creditors of secured debts, which are the majority of the total
debts, have equilibrium strategies in coordination games that affect the prices of unsecured
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10 Straight corporate bonds through a public offering in Japan in recent years are generally unsecured. Therefore, only
unsecured corporate bonds are considered in this article.
corporate bonds through coordination risk premiums. In other words, unsecured corporate
bond creditors have no influence over creditor coordination problems or corporate bond
prices; however, their bond prices are passively influenced by secured debt creditors’ strategic
actions in equilibrium. 
In our model, because it is difficult to obtain simple results for comparative statics with
analytical methods in terms of general parameter values, the following analysis employs a
numerical simulation. In detail, based on corporate bond prices calculated with equation (7),
we examine how various factors affect corporate bond prices. For numerical calculation, as a
benchmark case, the following set of variables is used: 
a = 0.1,  b = 5,  c = 5,  z = 1,  l = 0.5,  m = 0.4,  y = 1.6
More specifically, we carry out numerical simulations to illustrate the effect of a change in a
particular variable on corporate bond prices, maintaining the other variables in the benchmark
case. In all numerical simulations, we keep the variables within a range in which the unique-
ness of the equilibrium is guaranteed.
Our analysis will start with a consideration of how changes in prior expected fundamen-
tals y affect corporate bond prices. Figure 1 indicates that corporate bond prices increase
along with an increase in y. In other words, the higher the prior expected fundamentals
become, the higher the corporate bond prices. Figure 1 also depicts corporate bond prices in
the naïve model that does not take risks from failure in creditor coordination into account.11 It
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11 In this case, only fundamental risk matters in determining bond prices in the absence of coordination risk. This
applies to the case studied by Merton (1974) in his model of valuation for corporate bonds. 
Figure 1. The Effect of Prior Expected Fundamentals y on the Bond Price
is evident that the naïve model that neglects coordination risks overestimates corporate bond
prices compared to the model that considers coordination risks. The degree of over-estimation
is equivalent to the coordination risk premiums. Figure 1 shows that in the assessment of cor-
porate bond prices with credit risks, it is important to consider the coordination risk premi-
ums. This observation is consistent with that presented by Morris and Shin (2004).
Subsequently, we analyze how the accuracy of the private information available to the large
creditor c affects corporate bond prices. Figure 2 depicts a relationship between the large
creditor’s share m and corporate bond prices in these two cases: c = 0.5 and c = 50, while
keeping b constant. A case (c = 50) in which c is large and the accuracy of the information
available to the large creditor is high shows higher corporate bond prices than a case (c = 0.5)
in which c is small and the accuracy of the information available to the large creditor is low.
In other words, the more accurate the private information available to the large creditor
becomes, the greater the probability that the project will succeed and the higher the corporate
bond prices rise.
To explain how the accuracy of the private information available to the large creditor
affects corporate bond prices, it should be noted that changes in the accuracy of the private
information available to the large creditor directly affect creditor coordination, unlike public
information. This is because, although each creditor uses both public and private information
in decision-making, each creditor’s information is different and complete coordination is dis-
turbed because of the noise of the private information, which makes realized values vary
depending on the creditor. Therefore, the smaller the noise of the private information
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Figure 2. The Effect of the Accuracy of the Large Creditor’s Private Information c on
the Bond Price
becomes, the less each creditor’s information varies, making it easy for creditors to coordinate
with each other.
Considering the direct coordination effects of private information, we shall intuitively
explain the meaning of the influence of the large creditor’s private information on corporate
bond prices as follows. Even if the fundamentals are not so good, creditors know that if a suf-
ficient number of creditors continue to lend, the project can succeed. Therefore, even if the
expected fundamentals are not so good, the large creditor is motivated by the prospect of high
pay-offs to coordinate with the small creditors to continue lending and make the project suc-
ceed. For this reason, once creditor coordination becomes easy by increasing the accuracy of
the private information available to the large creditor, the large creditor becomes more positive
about continuing its lending. This is because the large creditor prioritizes the continuation of
its lending when coordinating with small creditors to make the project succeed and to obtain
high pay-offs. Since small creditors also know about the increasing accuracy of the private
information available to the large creditor, they also become more positive about continuing
their lending as they coordinate with the large creditor through higher beliefs. This intensity of
conformity among the creditors is the reason why increasing the accuracy of the private infor-
mation available to the large creditor heightens the probability of the project’s success and
raises the prices of the company’s corporate bonds.
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Figure 3. The Effect of the Accuracy of Public Information a on the Bond Price (y=1.6)
Next, we would like to analyze the effects of the degree of accuracy of the public infor-
mation a. Figure 3 explains a case of y =1.6 and Figure 4 explains a case of y = 0.4. These fig-
ures illustrate relationships between a and corporate bond prices. Figure 3 shows that if y is
large, the corporate bond prices rise as a rises; Figure 4 shows that if y is small, corporate
bond prices fall as a rises. In other words, if the fundamentals are good enough, improving
the accuracy of the public information raises corporate bond prices. On the other hand, if the
fundamentals are bad enough, improving the accuracy of the public information lowers corpo-
rate bond prices. 
It should be noted, when explaining the influence of public information on corporate
bond prices, that, unlike private information, while public information does not directly affect
creditor coordination, it does indirectly affect such coordination. This is because as the accu-
racy of the public information improves, and each creditor increasingly tends to regard the
public information as important when he/she develops posterior beliefs about the fundamen-
tals, the importance for the creditors of their private information diminishes. Consequently,
the noise of the private information is less likely to be passed onto their posterior beliefs, and
any variance in the posterior beliefs of the creditors also diminishes, which facilitates creditor
coordination.
Considering the indirect effects of public information on coordination, we shall intuitive-
ly explain the meaning of the influence of public information on corporate bond prices as fol-
lows. Creditors use public information to develop posterior beliefs concerning fundamentals.
If the fundamentals are good and the accuracy of the public information improves, creditors
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Figure 4. The Effect of the Accuracy of Public Information a on the Bond Price (y=0.4)
will increasingly tend to continue lending based on the following two factors. One factor is the
fundamental effect of public information. Under a condition in which the fundamentals are
good, creditors know that the project will succeed even if there are fewer creditors who contin-
ue lending. Therefore, if the fundamentals are good enough and the accuracy of the public
information improves, creditors have a better understanding of the good condition of the fun-
damentals. This strengthens the creditors’ tendency to continue lending; therefore, corporate
bond prices rise.
The second factor is the indirect effect of public information on coordination. As public
information becomes more accurate, each creditor puts more weight on public information to
develop posterior beliefs concerning fundamentals, therefore he/she reduces the weight of
their private information. Consequently, the noise of the private information becomes less
likely to be passed onto posterior beliefs and this reduces the variance in posterior beliefs
among the creditors. In this situation, if the fundamentals are good enough, they strengthen
the creditors’ tendency to coordinate their actions to continue their lending, therefore the cor-
porate bond prices rise. The reverse can occur if the fundamentals are bad. These conditions
suggest that if a company enjoys good financial conditions, the disclosure of company infor-
mation can bring favorable results for the company and its creditors, such as a reduction in
coordination risks and a rise in the company’s corporate bond prices. If a company is in a bad
financial situation, the disclosure of company information has unfavorable consequences for
the company and its creditors, such as an increase in coordination risks and a fall in the com-
pany’s corporate bond prices.12
5) Concluding Remarks
In this article, the coordination problems that a group of creditors face in the recovery of
credits with companies that might default are analyzed theoretically. Thus, the influence of the
large creditor on creditor coordination was explained and price changes in corporate bonds
were shown under various conditions. Generally, in coordination games in which self-fulfill-
ing beliefs significantly affect the determination of equilibrium, equilibrium cannot be
uniquely determined with complete information. In this article, a condition with incomplete
information in which creditors can only use noisy information about fundamentals is assumed
in the calculation of a unique Bayesian equilibrium based on global games, and corporate
bond prices in the equilibrium were examined.
Since analytical methods do not produce clear conclusions, we used numerical calcula-
tions and derived several important conclusions that indicate the characteristics of the equilib-
rium. Most of all, it was interesting that if the fundamentals are good enough and there is an
improvement in the accuracy of the information available to the large creditor, the probability
of the project’s success increases as does the value of the company’s corporate bonds. On the
other hand, if the fundamentals are bad and the accuracy of the information available to the
large creditor deteriorates, the probability of the project’s success declines and the value of the
company’s corporate bonds falls. This conclusion suggests that it is a sensitive question as to
whether or not it is desirable, from the point of view of either the borrowing company or that
company’s corporate bond holders, for the large creditor to hold precise private information,
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12 Related topics on the roles of public information are discussed by Hellwig (2002), Morris and Shin (2002a, b),
Bannier (2005a), and Bannier and Heinemann (2005).
since that desirability depends on the strength of the company’s fundamentals.
In this article, we tried to minimize the complication of our model structures as much as
possible by expressing basic ideas to simplify our explanation of the large creditor’s influence
on corporate bond prices in equilibrium in a situation in which the consequences of creditor
coordination affect the equilibrium. Therefore, although important conclusions were obtained
in a relatively simple form, to develop this model and use actual data and apply quantitative
market analysis, each abstract component of this model needs to be modified and changed
into a more practical form, and many elements that were omitted for simplification should be
considered.
In Japan and neighboring East Asian countries, the use of corporate bonds by companies
as a funding method could become advanced, and corporate bond markets could expand sig-
nificantly if there is support for future development of, one, market infrastructure, including
legal systems, two, information and telecommunications infrastructure, and, three, financial
technology.  However, in Japan, only a few years have passed since the elimination of the
qualification standard for bond issuance caused real losses to corporate bond creditors due to
defaults in corporate bonds. Thus, even though it is increasingly important to establish meth-
ods to assess corporate bond credit risks, and considering how Japan’s corporate bond markets
differ from those in the United States and Europe, both theoretical and empirical studies are
scarce, and research about the large creditor’s influence on corporate bond prices has only just
got started. The results of this article’s analysis suggest that large creditors such as main banks
could significantly affect corporate bond prices through their influence on creditor coordina-
tion. We expect that the importance of a large creditor’s influence on corporate bond prices
will be recognized; this issue will be further discussed as an extension of this article or from a
different perspective, and such discussions will contribute to the fruitful development of cor-
porate bond markets in Asia and other regions.
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